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The continuing debate surrounding the allocation of the American defense 
budget suggests that the new administration in Washington, although commit-
ted to strengthening American military capability, has yet to clarify in its own 
mind just what capabilities it wishes to strengthen. While they seem to agree 
that strategic nuclear forces need to be increased it appears that this agreement 
is based on a failure to thoroughly analyze and select weapons systems and 
tactical postures that conform realistically to the types of war that the United 
States is likely to be called upon to fight in the next two decades. 
A paradox seems evident. Hardly any defense "theologians" disagree that the 
two least likely employment scenarios for American forces are first, a general 
conventional war in Central Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and 
second, limited or general nuclear war resulting from any regional conflict that 
can reasonably be foreseen. Yet, the greatest proportion of increased defense 
expenditures seem illogically targeted to increase the capability of American 
forces to respond to just these unlikely scenarios. Of course, the deterrent 
strength of such forces is intended to make those potential conflicts unlikely. At 
the same time the far more logical scenarios of employment seem to be studi-
ously ignored so that little of the increase in defense spending is reserved for sus-
taining and improving the capability to fight limited conventional and, what 
seems most likely to occur, unconventional "brushfire" long-term guerilla 
conflicts. 
The danger of living in a real world is that at some point one's military forces 
may actually have to be used in defense of perceived interests. The key to a 
successful foreign and defense policy is to ensure that one sustains and develops 
military capabilities that are congruent with their most likely use. Especially as 
it addresses the ability to fight unconventional wars the congruence between US 
military capabilities and foreign policy objectives is seriously out of joint. It 
seems likely that any foreseeable American military involvement, especially as it 
addresses interests in the Western Hemisphere, will be of the counter-insur-
gency, unconventional war type. El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama 
and perhaps even Cuba could easily become future American battlefields. This 
kind of warfare demands very special military skills rooted in accurate doctrines 
and characterized by a very special mix of military force (the minor element) 
and political expertise (the major element). The notion that all types of war are 
amenable to the same military solution, merely killing the enemy, is a mistake 
of the first magnitude and one that characterized the American effort in Viet-
nam for ten years. The truth is that American forces today lack the doctrines, 
tactics, experience and even the manpower to fight a successful unconventional 
war in El Salvador or anywhere else.' 
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The war in Vietnam failed to produce any counter-insurgency doctrine or 
tactical approach to unconventional war worth its salt. What concepts and 
doctrines existed were drawn heavily from the experience of partisan armies in 
World War II. Indeed, it was the experience of these armies as translated by 
anti-communist East European emigre groups resident in the United States that 
provided the first impetus to establishing American counter-insurgency and 
unconventional warfare capabilities.2 Regarding Vietnam, even the senior 
officers who ran that war now openly admit that they did not develop adequate 
tactical doctrines. The consensus of the generals, as Douglas Kinnard points out 
in his book, The War Managers, is that the army never understood the character 
of unconventional operations nor did it develop successful doctrines and tactics 
to deal with it.3 What America did was deploy a conventionally configured army 
and use its doctrines and tactics compensating at every step with more firepower 
and technology. In the end it all failed because neither the political character of 
the war nor the special techniques needed for dealing with it were ever under-
stood or developed. 
Our battlefield techniques were no better. American policy never gave much 
credence to the idea that in a political war the "hearts and minds" of the people 
count very much. As a consequence we never developed the structures for inte-
grating programs that would reach and deal with the political and social 
problems that always underpin unconventional wars. We failed to develop a 
coherent application of technique to reach the populace, especially the need to 
subordinate military operations to larger policies, and continued to repeat the 
same mistakes over and over again. John Paul Vann, himself a former officer 
and high ranking AID4 official, summed it up well when he said that "we don't 
have twelve years experience in this country [Vietnam]. We have one year's 
experience twelve times!"5 
The point is that nothing has changed in terms of American capability to deal 
with unconventional warfare. After ten years of "experience" in that combat 
environment the Army's response was to ignore it and to produce a "new" 
manual of land warfare that placed the Army back on its more familiar conven-
tional footing giving it the new mission in Europe of "fighting outnumbered and 
winning."6 At the same time, even the limited unconventional warfare capacity 
of the Army was systematically dismantled. 
During Vietnam the US Army had available to it about twenty battalions of 
unconventional troops, usually Green Beret or Ranger forces, although the 
latter saw little action as coherent units. Although often tactically misused by 
being employed as assault troops or special intelligence operatives, on balance 
unconventional war units had substantial success among many of the native 
ethnic groups of the country. Their failure was essentially political: they found 
themselves caught up in a deadly power struggle over their control and function 
between the CIA and the Army establishment. The wide publicity attendant to 
the infamous Morosco affair in which a Vietnamese agent was executed by his 
Green Beret handlers marked the beginning of the end for the unconventional 
warfare establishment within the Army. Abandoned by their former CIA 
patrons, the counter-insurgency establishment was left to its fate at the hands of 
hostile generals.7 
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Vengeance was swift and sure. After the war, the number of available uncon-
ventional warfare force battalions was cut in half. Most of their groups were 
broken up and scattered to wide postings thus disrupting the continuity and 
training integrity of their organizations. Today, fewer than nine battalions, most 
of them less than one-third the strength of a regular Army infantry battalion, 
struggle to keep alive the traditions, doctrines, and values of the counter-insur-
gency capability of the Army.8 Equally destructive was the transference of many 
unconventional warfare resources to reserve units which, because of reduced 
manpower and retention under the All-Volunteer Force, quickly fell in strength 
and equipment. Fully 46 percent of the total authorized strength of unconven-
tional forces in the Army resides in reserve units most of which are ill-trained, 
ill-equipped and cannot be realistically expected to deploy.9 Additionally, as 
part of the Army's post-Vietnam reorganization many of the functions that were 
transferred to reserve units were those directly associated with the ability of 
unconventional warfare units to deal with the "hearts and minds" problems 
encountered in guerilla wars. The transfer of such crucial functions served to 
relegate them to even further obscurity when they were addressed at all in the 
doctrines of unconventional war.10 
Perhaps most devastating to the unconventional warfare capability of the 
American Army was the deliberate attempt to weaken its officer leadership. 
During Vietnam a tour of service in the unconventional forces was regarded as 
very important to the career progression of an officer. With the Morosco affair, 
the losing battle with the Pentagon, and the retirement of Colonel Roulx, head 
of the Green Berets and long expected to be its first general officer, duty with 
unconventional warfare units became the kiss of death for any officer truly 
interested in rising to the top. Officers assigned to these units tend to be loyal 
and dedicated but most clearly understand that their careers, if not at an end, 
will not be helped by their assignments with such units. As a consequence, even 
command assignments to unconventional warfare units are resisted and refused 
by knowledgable officers, a fact which is not helped at all by the general 
shortage of company grade officers in the Army at large." 
Finally, resources for training were reduced along with troop strength, bring-
ing the general problems of poor training standards and retention which afflict 
the Army as a whole to the once elite counter-insurgency units. The lack of 
official interest in unconventional warfare is clearly reflected in dropping 
counter guerilla courses or reducing their content in the major Army staff 
schools. Within two years of the end of the Vietnam war unconventional war as 
a serious subject of study virtually stopped. As one officer noted, he couldn't 
even find a map of Vietnam at the War College! As a consequence, the 
doctrinal review of American successes and failures in the unconventional 
environment that was so necessary to building and sustaining an adequate 
unconventional war capability was never undertaken. Thus, today's doctrines 
remain essentially what they were in Vietnam and the Army has shown no 
interest in seriously reexamining them. We are as ill-prepared to fight a counter-
guerilla war as we were in 1963, the year the first American advisors began 
arriving in Vietnam. 
Allowing the unconventional warfare capability of the United States to fall 
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into disrepair is dangerous, given that they are the most likely type of forces to 
be required in the years ahead. The danger is increased by President Reagan's 
belief, and that of his advisors, that the Army does have the capability to engage 
in unconventional operations in Latin America if necessary.12 His stated belief 
that the American military was not beaten in the political war in Vietnam (the 
new "stab in the back" legend) but was not allowed to win it (presumably by 
liberal Democratic politicians) suggests that he has a clouded view of what 
happened to US forces in those jungles. It also indicated that he is sorely 
unaware of the lack of trained manpower, inadequate doctrines, tactics and 
political techniques available to the Army to carry out the unconventional 
warfare role that he envisions for it in Latin America and elsewhere. 
The dismantling of the Army's unconventional warfare capability is one of the 
sadder and unnecessary consequences of the war in Vietnam. It is also one of the 
more unrealistic. Moreover, the prospects for rebuilding that capability do not 
seem particularly bright. In the first place there is no spokesman for the cause 
within the civilian administration. Most are strategic oriented ideologues when 
they are not simply naive. Further, a whole generation of high level officers has 
risen to the top of the Army, men who clearly understand that their careers are 
not rooted in a successful unconventional war experience. Only a handful of 
these officers ever had any field experience with unconventional warfare units. 
Most made their promotions by championing conventional units and conven-
tional doctrines. They are far more interested and romanced by conventional 
concepts or such marginally different ones as the Rapid Deployment Force. 
They are not champions of a strong unconventional warfare capability because 
they have no reason to be. 
In the end it is unlikely that the United States will rebuild its capacity to 
conduct unconventional warfare operations short of actually having to engage in 
them. This inevitably risks repeating the pattern in Vietnam probably with the 
same results. Already to the trained ear events in El Salvador and Central 
America and the US response to them are beginning to sound strangely 
familiar. And the US Army is as prepared to fight there as it was to fight in 
Vietnam. 
Footnotes 
1. See Sam C. Sarkesian, William L. Scully, eds.. U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: 
Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s (New York, 1981), pp. 5-15. 
2. Captain Shaun M. Darragh, "Rangers and Special Forces: Two Edges of the Same Dagger". 
Army, vol. 27, no. 12 (1977), p. 15. 
3. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover, N.H., 1977), passim. 
4. Agency for International Development. 
5. Quoted in Ward Just, Military Men (New York, 1970), p. 212. 
6. U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-100 Ground Operations (Washington, D.C., 1976). 
7. Eliot D. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp. 32, 72. 76, 86-88; see also Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counter-
insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present (New York. 1977) for an 
authoritative account of the "rise and fall" of the unconventional warfare establishment. 
8. Sarkesian, pp. 73-74; see also Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Galvin, "Special Forces at the 
Crossroads", Army, vol. 23, no. 12 (1973), pp. 21-24. 
9. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report on Status and Disposition of Reserve Forces 
(Washington, D.C., 1979). 
10. As of August 1981 the Psychological Warfare slot in the Army's Operations Readiness Mobiliz-
ation Directorate was vacant. 
11. Sarkesian, p. 75; Just, pp. 119-20. 
12. Some 54 Special Forces advisers were dispatched to El Salvador earlier this year and in 
October, following the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat, the U.S. Government 
indicated that such advisers might also be sent to Sudan. 
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT AMONG AFRICAN STATES: 
THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 
by 
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This is a brief analysis of the patterns of conflict among African states, the 
Organization of African Unity's (OAU) role with regard to pacific settlement of 
the various disputes, and the essence of the organization's approach on the basis 
of its record so far. The concept of "pacific settlement" is examined and used as 
a premise for analyzing the role of the OAU in selected cases, especially in view 
of the nature of intra-African disputes. Some imminent or possible future 
developments and challenges are noted and new strategies for pacific settlement 
are proposed and some conclusions drawn therefrom. 
Pacific Settlement as Mediation 
The idea of "pacific settlement", the common mode of conflict resolution in 
Africa, is premised on a number of assumptions. These include the efficacy of 
pacific settlement in a given context, jurisdictional rights or authority to mediate 
in a particular dispute, and organizational capacity for effectiveness. These 
assumptions overlook a number of factors which are crucial to any inquiries 
into, conceptualization and explanations of, the settlement of conflicts within 
Africa. 
Anybody or group interested in getting involved in the pacific settlement of 
any particular conflict takes on the role of an intermediary or mediator. His 
responsibility is to assist the parties involved in settling whatever dispute had led 
to confrontation among them. For settlement to come "peacefully", the medi-
ator would not function as a tribunal passing judgement and negotiations should 
not take place in what Venkata Raman has called "a strictly adversary form".1 
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